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 OUR FORGOTTEN COLONY:  
PUERTO RICO AND THE WAR ON DRUGS 
 
By LeeAnn O’Neill and Jennifer Gumbrewicz, Esq.* 
I n a time where the war in Iraq and the war on terrorism dominates the front page news, the War on Drugs has been relegated to a second class position. However, for decades, 
the War on Drugs has silently “hunted” minorities, sending them 
to jails in disproportionate numbers and infringing on their Con-
stitutional rights. Despite the nation’s new focus in the Middle 
East, the effects of the War on Drugs are still as devastating as 
when it began. A “country of minorities,” Puerto Rico is not only 
a prime target of the War on Drugs, it is also a key drug portal to 
the U.S. and the Caribbean and the rates of crime and drug ad-
diction are among the highest in the world.2 The War on Drugs 
in Puerto Rico has created an inner city ghetto in a beautiful 
tropical paradise.  
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PUERTO RICO 
The contentious relationship between the United States and 
Puerto Rico creates a complicated background for the War on 
Drugs. The United States acquired Puerto Rico as a colony from 
Spain through the Treaty of Paris in 1899. In 1900, the Foraker 
Act allowed Puerto Rico to establish a civil government. The 
Jones Act followed in 1917, wherein Congress granted Puerto 
Ricans “statutory citizenship.”3 Although this technically granted 
U.S. citizenship to Puerto Ricans, the rights of a statutory citizen 
are different than those of a constitutional citizen. In 1950, Pub-
lic Law 600 gave Puerto Rico the right to adopt its own constitu-
tion and establish a relationship with the United States via a 
compact.4 Just two years later, the Commonwealth of Puerto 
Rico was established under its own constitution.5 Despite several 
status referendums, Puerto Rico still has a nebulous position as 
an unincorporated U.S. territory – somewhere in between a col-
ony and a state.6 The status debate alone is fraught with constitu-
tional and self-determination issues that cannot even begin to be 
explored in this article.7 
This quasi-state, quasi-territory status creates tensions be-
tween Puerto Rico and the federal government. Congress and the 
Supreme Court wield the ultimate authority as to which constitu-
tional provisions apply to Puerto Rico and whether or not federal 
law preempts local law on the island.8 This treatment, however, 
has been extremely inconsistent. For example, in Examining 
Board of Engineers, Architects and Surveyors v. de Otero, the 
Supreme Court held that the District Court of Puerto Rico was 
obligated to enforce the federal civil rights statute to protect 
rights secured by the Constitution.9 Just a year later, in Harris v. 
Rosario, the Court held that rights invoked under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause did not have to be protected because “Congress, 
which is empowered under the Territory Clause of the Constitu-
tion… may treat Puerto Rico differently from States so long as 
there is a rational basis for its actions.”10 Equally controversial is 
the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act, which states that the 
statutory laws of the United States apply equally in Puerto Rico 
as in the rest of the United States unless “locally inapplicable.”11 
The Act also provides the Supreme Court with discretion to de-
termine what the U.S. government deems “locally inapplica-
ble.”12  
THE WAR ON DRUGS 
In the early half of the 20th century, a number of federal 
drug laws passed through Congress criminalizing drug use.13 The 
Nixon administration first coined the phrase “War on Drugs.”14 
The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 
1970 centralized the piecemeal federal legislation involving the 
prohibition and regulation of illicit drugs.15 The Act “classifies 
substances… into five categories of controlled substances…
[and]… criminalizes manufacturing, distributing, dispensing, and 
possessing controlled substances in violation of the Act’s com-
prehensive regulatory scheme.”16 The Reagan administration 
escalated the War on Drugs by passing the Anti-Drug Abuse Act 
of 1986.17 The Act “increased penalties and instituted mandatory 
minimum sentences for most drug offenses.”18 The 1980s 
brought a massive increase in the number of drug cases brought 
to federal courts. “While the overall rate of criminal cases filed 
in the United States district courts rose sixty-nine percent [from 
1980 to 1990], the number of drug cases increased nearly three 
hundred percent.”19  
The War on Drugs is primarily adjudicated in the federal 
criminal justice system. Given the transient nature of drug smug-
gling, which crosses not only national but international borders, 
only the federal government has the proper jurisdiction and 
enough resources to combat this problem.20 
The main U.S. suppliers of cocaine are South and Central 
American countries. Texas, Florida, California, Puerto Rico and 
New York consistently lead the country in total cocaine sei-
zures.21 Their positions as border states make them ideal for drug 
trafficking due to access via numerous waterways and infrastruc-
tures designed to distribute drugs to large markets.   
THE WAR ON DRUGS—DRUG EXCEPTIONALISM 
The courts tend to view the War on Drugs in a favorable 
manner, often giving more leeway to law enforcement officers 
investigating drug related crimes, and analyzing drug cases using 
more flexible standards, such as “reasonableness.”22 This con-
cept of viewing the War on Drugs favorably is best described as 
Inter arma silent leges—in time of war, the laws are silent1 
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 “drug exceptionalism” and is explained by Erik Luna in his arti-
cle entitled, “Symposium: New Voices on the War on Drugs: 
Drug Exceptionalism.”23 His argument introduces the proposi-
tion that constitutional criminal procedure should be applied the 
same no matter the crime.24 However, many legal scholars note 
that, in reality, courts make exceptions in drug cases.25 Primarily 
in the context of Fourth Amendment cases, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has found that probable cause is not always necessary in a 
number of drug related seizures.26 Additionally, in light of the 
so-called “border exception,” the Supreme Court has decreased 
the legal protections normally applied for searches,  seizures, 
and detentions that occur near the U.S. borders.27  
THE WAR ON MINORITIES 
The escalation in drug enforcement dramatically affects 
minority communities, particularly the African American and 
Latino communities. The rates of incarceration for minorities are 
significantly higher than those for Caucasians.28 Consequently, 
minorities are overrepresented in the federal prison system in 
relation to their representation in the overall population. 
Two major reasons for higher rates of incarceration for mi-
norities involved in drug related offenses are the drug laws 
themselves and the nature of their enforcement. First, the laws 
are more likely to be enforced against minorities. Presumably, in 
an effort to catch more drug offenders, the police are more likely 
to patrol inner city streets where people are outside in plain view 
rather than the suburban neighborhoods where much of the drug 
activity occurs behind closed doors. Not only are there higher 
rates of patrol in areas where drug use is concentrated, but race 
is also considered one of a list of legal and acceptable factors 
law enforcement uses in routine traffic stops and drug courier 
profiles.29 Most drug courier profiles from various law enforce-
ment agencies include characteristics such as the destination or 
city of origin, nervousness, at what point a person deplanes, and 
race.30 Race can also be used as a factor in other brief detentions 
by law enforcement.31  
Second, the laws target the minority population. While on 
their face the laws seem to be racially neutral, they are not ra-
cially neutral in their application. (See Table I below). For ex-
ample, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have the same sen-
tence for 500 grams of powder cocaine and 5 grams of crack 
cocaine.32 On its face, this crack/cocaine disparity in sentencing 
does not seem to be a racial issue; however, powder cocaine is 
generally used by a predominantly suburban, upper class, white 
population and crack cocaine is used predominately by an urban 
and minority population.33  
 
Source: Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to  
Disparity.  28 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 161, 204-208 (1991) 
DRUG TRAFFICKING IN PUERTO RICO 
Central and South American drug traffickers have used 
Puerto Rico as a portal to the U.S. because of the diminished 
border scrutiny in that area, allowing for an easier exchange of 
people and goods from Puerto Rico to the United States.34 “An 
important incentive for the traffickers in reaching Puerto Rico is 
the possibility that illicit drugs can be transported to the conti-
nental United States in cargo that is not subject to further inspec-
tion by [Customs and Border Patrol]. Puerto Rico also is an at-
tractive sea and air transportation site in the Caribbean because 
the island has one of the busiest seaports in North America, and 
an abundance of commercial flights to the United States.”35 In 
1995, Puerto Rico was designated as a High Intensity Drug Traf-
ficking Area (HIDTA), which prompted the Drug Enforcement 
Agency to direct more resources to Puerto Rico.36  
THE WAR ON DRUGS AS A WAR ON PUERTO RICO 
The Federal District Court of Puerto Rico plays a central 
role in the War on Drugs because approximately 68% of feder-
ally sentenced defendants in Puerto Rico are drug offenders.37 
Unlike other high drug offense jurisdictions, Puerto Rico is the 
only one that is a “state” of minorities.38 Coupled with Puerto 
Rico’s tenuous status as a “commonwealth” with its citizen’s 
rights dictated by Congress and the Supreme Court and not by 
the United States Constitution, the War on Drugs has trans-
formed into a war on Puerto Rico. Furthermore, it is important 
to note that the uncertainty of Puerto Rico’s status magnifies the 
effects of the War on Drugs as a war on minorities. In addition 
to the traditional inherent racial bias of the War on Drugs dis-
cussed above, the United States justifies trampling on the rights 
of Puerto Ricans as an extension of the War on Drugs. The gov-
ernment’s violation of the right to a jury trial and due process, 
its application of the death penalty, and drug exceptionalism are 
just a few issues highlighted by the War on Drugs in Puerto 
Rico. 
RIGHTS IN A WAR ZONE 
Since Puerto Rico is an unincorporated territory, not all of 
the fundamental rights granted by the U.S. Constitution are 
granted to the citizens of Puerto Rico. Unlike states, Puerto Rico 
cannot incorporate these rights through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.39 Arguably, the biggest exclusion is the right to jury 
trial.40 Although Puerto Rico is constitutionally protected under 
the due process clause,41 the U.S. Constitution does not grant 
Puerto Rico the protection of the Sixth Amendment  right to jury 
trial because it is not deemed to be a fundamental constitutional 
right.42 The implication is a devastating psychological injury to 
Puerto Rico. The logic of the court stigmatizes Puerto Ricans as 
second class U.S. citizens – they are not “good enough” to be 
afforded the right to jury trial, which was deemed a fundamental 
right in Duncan v. Louisiana43 and is twice guaranteed by the 
U.S. Constitution.44 However, the local constitution of Puerto 
Rico grants a right to jury trial for felonies in lieu of the U.S. 
Table I – All Offenders Sentenced in 1989 
  Pre-Guidelines Guidelines 
Total 16,027 (100%) 21,057 (100%) 
White 10,618 (66.3%) 9,372 (44.5%) 
Black 3,580 (22.3%) 5,523 (26.2%) 
Hispanic 1,265 (8.5%) 5,538 (26.3%) 
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To add insult to injury, federal courts in Puerto Rico require 
jurors to be proficient in English because the “overwhelming 
national interest served by the use of English in a United States 
court… justifies conducting proceed-
ings in the District of Puerto Rico in 
English and requiring jurors to be pro-
ficient in that language,” and therefore 
precludes alternatives like simultane-
ous translation.46 If the Sixth Amend-
ment applied in Puerto Rico, the lan-
guage qualification would clearly vio-
late the Amendment because it guar-
antees the right of the accused to have 
a jury composed from a cross section of his community.47 It is 
nearly impossible to find such a jury that meets the language 
proficiency because 71.9% of Puerto Ricans are not proficient in 
English.48 Consequently, juries consist of an English-speaking 
elite and thus systematically excludes the Spanish-speaking 
population.  
The federal government has also preempted local law with 
federal statutes to facilitate the War on Drugs. For example, the 
First Circuit Court of Appeals in  United States v. Quinones held 
that the Omnibus Crime Control Act, which regulates  the use of 
wiretap evidence, preempts the Puerto Rican constitutional ban 
against such evidence.49 Authorizing wiretapped evidence, de-
spite a local constitutional ban against it, violates the rights of 
Puerto Rico’s citizens. Considering that 78% of court-authorized 
wiretaps are used for narcotics-related crime investigations, it is 
clear that the local rights of Puerto Rico’s citizens are not taken 
very seriously by the federal government or by the judicial sys-
tem.50  More grievous than the federal government’s preemption 
with regard to wiretapping is the federal government’s disregard 
of Puerto Rico’s constitutional ban against the death penalty.51  
U.S. District Judge of Puerto Rico Salvador Casellas ex-
pressed his indignation by asserting that “it shocks the con-
science to impose the ultimate penalty, death, upon American 
citizens who are denied the right to participate directly or indi-
rectly in the government that enacts and authorizes the imposi-
tion of such punishment.”52 In 1988, the Drug Kingpin Statute 
allowed federal prosecutors to seek the death penalty for mur-
ders that occur during the course of a 
drug-kingpin conspiracy.53 More nota-
bly, the Federal Death Penalty Act 
(FDPA) of 1994 allowed the death 
penalty to be sought for the running of 
a large-scale drug enterprise.54 The 
First Circuit Court of Appeals in 
United States v. Acosta-Martinez,55 a 
case where the U.S. Attorney pursued 
the death penalty for a murder com-
mitted during a drug offense, overturned a successful challenge 
to the enforcement of the death penalty in the district court of 
Puerto Rico.56 Many jurors were excluded from the Acosta-
Martinez jury pool because of their anti-death penalty senti-
ments.57 Thus, it should come as no surprise then that the U.S. 
Attorneys in Puerto Rico have submitted the largest number of 
potential capital cases for review than any of the other 94 federal 
judicial districts, making Puerto Ricans subject to more federal 
prosecutions than other jurisdictions.58  
CONCLUSION  
As second-class citizens with diminished constitutional 
rights, Puerto Ricans have been further disenfranchised by the 
War on Drugs. We have seen that in times of war, including the 
War on Drugs, certain fundamental rights are pushed to the side. 
In the case of Puerto Rico, the War on Drugs has affected cer-
tain fundamental rights with regards to life, fair trials and pri-
vacy. The U.S. government has become the distant slumlord of 
the fundamental rights of Puerto Rico’s citizens. The U.S. 
should learn a valuable lesson with regards to the way it has 
treated Puerto Rico: “treat a nation like a ghetto and it will be-
have like a ghetto.”59  
 
Unlike states, Puerto Rico cannot 
incorporate these rights through 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Arguably, the biggest exclusion is 
the right to jury trial 
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